To efficiently control a process, accurate sensor measurements must be provided of the signals used by the controller to decide which actions to actuate in order to maintain the system in the desired conditions. Noisy show the possibility to achieve an adequate control of the process even when a sensor failure occurs.
Introduction
When a fault occurs in a sensor whose measurements are used for the control of an industrial process, a repair action must be promptly initiated since the use of incorrect information by the controller could compromise the correct functioning of the process, with potential fallbacks both on production and safety. In this context, on-line monitoring methods can provide an indication of the health of the sensors and supply an early warning of incipient faults, thus enabling to assess the reliability of the measurement and to opportunely plan the sensor maintenance. Additionally, for continuing operation while reparation is performed, the erroneous measurements should be substituted by accurate estimates of the signal true values.
The main objective of this work is to devise an on-line monitoring scheme to reduce the effects of sensor faults on the process control, by detecting the faults and by reconstructing the correct signal values. Three steps are envisaged: (a) validate the sensor measurements, (b) detect and identify faults and (c) reconstruct the correct values of the faulty signals. Steps (a) and (c) can be performed by resorting to a model that generates estimates of the correct sensors signal values based on actual readings and correlations among them; step (b) can be performed by a fault detection and identification module which determines, as early as possible, whether the sensors are behaving anomalously and identifies the faulty ones among them.
Concerning the development of a signal validation and reconstruction model, a common approach is that of using auto-associative models (Hoffmann, 2006; Holbert and Upadhyaya, 1990; Roverso et al., 2007) . The practical problem, however, is that a single auto-associative model cannot handle the multiplicity of signals measured on a real plant (Baraldi et al., 2008; Fantoni and Mazzola, 1996; 0Fantoni et al., 2003; Zio et al., 2007) . A possible way to overtake this limitation is to subdivide the signals into small overlapping groups, develop an ensemble of models, one for each group, and finally combine their outcomes. Key to building of the ensemble is the diversity of the individual models. In the approach investigated in this work, diversity is promoted by randomly generating the signals groups according to the Random Feature Selection Ensemble (RFSE) technique (Bryll et al., 2003) ; this is a completely random technique in which no optimization of the composition of the individual groups is sought, i.e., no relevance is given, for example, to the correlation between the signals in the groups or to their capability of reconstruction. The groups thereby created are used to develop a corresponding number of signal validation and reconstruction PCA models (Jolliffe, 2002; Diamantaras and Kung, 1996; Scholkopf et al., 1999; Moore, 1981) . The outcomes of different models are then aggregated using a LF method (Baraldi et al., 2009; Bonissone et al., 2008) . To improve the accuracy of the reconstruction, past signal measurements are used as further input to the models and the reconstruction of the faulty signals is iterated until satisfactory convergence.
The detection and identification of a sensor fault can be achieved by comparing the actual sensor measurements with the signal values estimated by the signal validation and reconstruction model; in this work, the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) which considers the statistical properties of the residual, i.e. the difference between the measurements and their estimation, is used.
The proposed approach has been applied to a case study concerning the level and pressure control in the pressurizer of a PWR nuclear power plant. In order to test the effectiveness of the described procedure, faults have been added to sensors whose signals are simulated using a Matlab SIMULINK model of the pressurizer. Upon fault detection, the reconstructed value of the faulty signal is used by the controller to decide the control action. A comparison is made of the control performance obtained when feeding the controller with the measurements coming from the faulty sensor or the reconstructed values.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 states the problems of fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction in the frame of process control; Section 3 describes the signal validation module, recalling briefly the RFSE and LF techniques; Section 4 describes the SPRT technique implemented in the fault detection module; Section 5 presents the results from a set of experiments concerning the control of a simulated PWR pressurizer in presence of faults of the sensors; finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions and describes potential future directions of research.
Sensor fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction for process control
The objective of a controller is to correct the mismatch between the true values 
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In order to catch the dynamic evolution of the system and increase the robustness of the method, the set of Fig. 3 reports a sketch of the flow of modelling for signal reconstruction. A set of (Bryll et al., 2003) . This guarantees high signal diversity in the overlapping groups upon which the PCA models are built and allows for rapid construction of the signal groups. Furthermore, randomly selecting the signals in the groups with a reasonable choice of the group size parameters m and H , can basically guarantee coverage of all the signals in the ensemble with adequate redundancy (Aly and Atiya, 2006; Bryll et al., 2003) .
As mentioned above, the H diverse signal groups generated are used as bases for developing a corresponding number of PCA validation and reconstruction models. To do this, the data set X of N signal patterns available is partitioned into a training set TRN X (made of TRN N patterns) and a test set TST X (made of TST N patterns); the former is used to train the individual models, whereas the latter is used to verify the ensemble performance in the signal reconstruction task in order to determine the optimal values of parameters m and H (Baraldi et al., 2009a) . The models thus obtained are then used online for the signal validation and reconstruction process.
Each signal i f is present in a number i H of groups and thus a corresponding number of individual PCA models provide its reconstruction. Different methods can be used to aggregate the outcomes of these individual models in the ensemble, in order to get the final reconstructed value. In this work a local fusion strategy has been adopted.
After the ensemble of PCA models has been trained, it can be used to validate and reconstruct the actual 
Local fusion strategies for models outcome aggregation
Different techniques have been proposed for the aggregation of the outcomes of multiple models (Baraldi et al., 2009b; Bonissone et al., 2008) . In general, the aggregation of the models outcomes requires to associate a 
The most common technique is the simple mean which assigns the same value to all weights and set to zero the bias corrections, i.e. The main steps of the local fusion process are:
1) Retrieve a set TRN Q of neighbours of the pattern under reconstruction from the set of training patterns.
According to the k -nn-based neighbourhood approach here adopted (Bonissone et al., 2008) , TRN Q is formed by the k training patterns nearest to the test pattern (Fig. 5) . The optimal number k of nearest neighbours to be considered is obtained verifying the LF performance on the test set TST X . 2) Associate a weight and a bias to each individual model of the ensemble depending on its reconstruction accuracy on the retrieved neighbours. According to (Baraldi et al., 2009b) , the local bias correction the local mean absolute error computed on a different dataset than the one used for the training of the models. The new data set is built by adding an artificial noise to the training data before their reconstruction; in this way, the training error used to estimate the weights will also account for the robustness of the model, thus keeping us from assigning high weights to models whose outstanding performance on the training set is not due to their real quality, but rather derives from overfitting.
3) Aggregate the outputs by using eq. (1), which accounts for the models weights and bias.
Statistical decision logic for fault detection
The detection of a sensor fault is often achieved by comparison between the actual sensor measurement
and the measurement estimate
provided by a signal validation and reconstruction model which reproduces the response of the sensor in non-faulty conditions. Many techniques are based on the monitoring of the residual signal Gross and Kumenik, 1991) , for detecting a fault when the residual exceeds a threshold value previously set. To provide the earliest possible indication of a process anomaly, many techniques adopt the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) (Wald, 1947) to detect changes over time in the statistical characteristics of the residual signal i e (Gross and Kumenik, 1991) .
The fault detection module implemented in this work also adopts the SPRT and not just for signalling the occurrence of a fault when the residual exceeds the threshold value, but also to return in output the condition of the sensors, by performing a statistical hypothesis test on the mean and variance of the residuals: at each time step t , the null hypothesis
Hp , corresponding to the normal, fault-free condition of the i -th sensor, is tested against the alternative hypothesis
Hp corresponding to the faulty sensor.
The residual signal i e has the Gaussian distribution
, where Hp is based on the value of the log-likelihood ratio ) t ( λ i in the following eq. (4); this is initialized to the value
at the initial time and is updated as follows, as time proceeds (Wald, 1947; Yang et al., 2009 ):
If the hypothesis 0 i
Hp is correct, the fourth term of eq. (4) to the effect of the third term. In order to decide whether sensor i is faulty or not, a value  is fixed for the probability of false alarm (sensor i is considered faulty although it is in normal condition), and a value  is fixed for the probability of missed alarm (sensor i is considered in normal condition although it is faulty).
An upper U B and a lower L B thresholds for ) t ( λ i are obtained from  and  through eqs. (5) and (6):
exceeds the value U B a fault to sensor i is detected, whereas the normal condition is diagnosed when the value L B is reached. After one of the two boundaries is reached, the value of the log-likelihood
is kept constant until its trend is inverted.
Constant bias on the sensor measurement i f can be diagnosed by setting σ is performed by a trial and error procedure looking for a trade off between a low rate of false alarms and a low rate of undetected faults.
The fault detection and identification module here implemented is based on the sequential application of the SPRT to all sensors and all types of considered faults (in general bias or noise faults). Although in this work the case of multiple sensor failures is not considered, the proposed procedure can be extended to deal also with this important situation. Also, notice that a fault in the measurement i f may cause some other correlated signals to be incorrectly reconstructed and subsequently falsely identified as faulty too; this phenomenon is called fault propagation and can lead to a high rate of false alarms in signal validation. Then, in case of multiple faults detected by the SPRT, one should verify that they are not a consequence of fault propagation. Different techniques have been proposed to tackle the problem of fault propagation. Within an ensemble approach to signal validation, the technique proposed in (Chenggang and Bingjing, 2006) based on a general sub-grouping technique that uses specially designed intersections between sub-groups to eliminate the false alarms caused by fault propagation seems promising.
Case study
To verify the applicability of the proposed approach of fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction to the measurements used by a controller for deciding which actions to actuate, a simulation case study regarding the pressurizer of a PWR nuclear power plant has been considered.
Pressurizer model
Fig. 6 is a schematic representation of the pressurizer system for which a Matlab SIMULINK model has been developed, based on the application of the mass and energy conservation equations to the two regions of vapour and liquid; exchanges between the two regions, due to evaporation of liquid and condensation of steam, are taken into account (Kuridan and Beynon, 1998; Todreas and Kazimi, 1990) . The system of non linear differential equations describing the model is detailed in the Appendix. The data set X is built using the signals recorded during different transients, which have been simulated by randomly changing the rate of the surge line mass flow entering the pressurizer. All transients are simulated starting from the initial conditions reported in Table 1 . The surge line mass flow rate depends on the reactor Cold Leg
power; in particular, when the Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system pressure or temperature rise, the higher pressure or the increase of water volume in the PHT circuit push some coolant from this system into the pressurizer (in-surge flow); on the contrary, in case of low PHT system pressure, some liquid moves from the pressurizer into the PHT system circuit (out-surge flow). In this application, the transients have been generated by assuming surge mass flow rates in the range of [-10 ; +10] kg/s, positive values indicating insurge flow and negative values out-surge flow. In order to represent a realistic situation, the simulations have been carried out based on the operational parameters of a standard PWR pressurizer. Moreover the total mass of water entering or exiting the pressurizer during a surge line mass flow transient has been related to the temperature variations of the coolant in the PHT system. In order to test the method on pseudo-realistic data, white noise has been added to each signal according to engineering considerations on the sensors accuracy (Hashemian, 2004; Hashemian, 2006; Johnson, 2008) . Table 3 reports the standard deviations of the considered noises. 
Controller model
In this application, the control of the level L and the pressure P in the pressurizer is achieved through the feedback control scheme shown in Fig. 7 , which reproduces the scheme used in a standard PWR pressurizer. 
Simulation of sensor faults
When a fault affects the pressure or the level measurements, the controller receives incorrect input signals which may lead to an actuation decision different from the one it would take in absence of sensor faults. Let To illustrate the consequences of a fault on a sensor measuring a controller input signal, the effects on the system of the fault reported in Table 4 are considered. 
in the case of the pressure sensor fault of Table 4 (right). Fig. 11 compares, in the same case, the behaviours of the two controller output variables used to control the process, i.e. the sprayers mass flow rate (upper) and the heaters power (bottom). Notice that at 50  t s, when there is the pressure sensor fault, the controller believes (wrongly) that the pressure has exceeded its reference value Ref P f ; therefore, instead of starting the heaters at 60  t s as it would have done in normal sensors conditions (Fig. 11, bottom left) , it turns on the sprayers in order to decrease the pressure (Fig. 11, upper right) . Consequently, the undesired pressure decrease is accelerated by the wrong control decision. At the end of the plant transient, when the out-surge stops, the pressure stabilizes at a value which is lower than the reference of a quantity comparable with the amplitude of the sensor bias.
At the same time, the total mass of liquid introduced in the pressurizer by the sprayers increases the level of This example demonstrates that the controller can actually take wrong decisions when its inputs are altered by a sensor fault.
Application of the fault detection and signal reconstruction methodology
In this Section, the developed model for the fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction is described and applied to the case study under analysis.
Signal validation
Since the pressurizer operation strongly depends from the pressure and temperature of the PHT system, in order to build a more accurate signal validation model the information coming from the seven sensors of the pressurizer should be integrated by information related with the PHT system state. In this case study, since only the pressurizer and not the complete reactor has been simulated, the variations occurring outside the pressurizer are taken into account by considering an additional signal numerically computed as
, which represents the transfer of mass between the PHT system and the pressurizer during a transient.
which are given as input to the validation model is made of current and past values of the measured signals listed in Section 5.1.1 plus the present and past values of M f (Fig. 12) .
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Fig. 12: input pattern used for the reconstruction of the current signal measurement.
A set of 70 faults-free transients have been simulated and used for the training of the PCA models, whereas 10 distinct transients have been used for testing the performance of the proposed approach in order to optimize the parameters m , H and k . 
The fault detection and identification module
The signal validation model produces a reconstruction Table 4 where a fault is added to the pressure sensor measurement.
The signal reconstruction module
Once again the pressure sensor fault of Table 4 is used to illustrate the improvements which can be obtained by reconstructing the faulty signals after the fault has been detected by the SPRT. Fig. 15 compares the evolution of the true pressure and level signals values,
respectively, in the case of normal sensors conditions (left) and in the case of the fault affecting the pressure measurement, when applying the fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction modules (right). Fig. 16 compares, in the same case, the behaviours of the heaters; the sprayers mass flow rate is in both cases almost always zero, and thus it is not shown here. Notice that, even if a sensor fault has occurred, the evolutions of all signals and in particular of the true pressure and level signals,
, are very similar to those obtained in case of normal sensors conditions. 
Comparison of the results obtained with or without fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction
Assuming as reference the behaviour of the controller when all sensors are in normal conditions, the consequences of a fault to sensor I i with successive fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction are compared to those without. The deviation
of the true value of the C i -th controlled signal in case of normal sensor conditions
is considered. In particular two performance indicators are evaluated, providing local (eq. (7)) and integral (eq. (8)) information about the effects of the fault on the controlled system, respectively (the lower the indicators, the better the controller performance): To confirm these results a number of other system faults have been analyzed (Table 6 and Table 7 
In particular, two tests have been performed by considering: 1) the 16 sensor faults of Table 6 and Table 7 occur during each of the eight pressurizer transients;
2) as in 1) but applying fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction.
To evaluate the performance in test 2, the delay time  necessary to detect the fault after its occurrence is considered. Fig. 17 shows the mean value of the delay times obtained in the eight transients simulated for each fault magnitude, in case of pressure (left) or level (right) fault. Table 8 . Table 8 Mean fault detection time delay τ for the smallest detectable faults.
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Results discussion
The results presented in this Section demonstrate that with the fault detection, identification and signal reconstruction approach proposed it is possible to effectively control the pressurizer when a fault occurs on the pressure or level sensors, in the sense that the controlled variables obtained using the reconstructed signals do not diverge from their setpoints and the system behaviour is kept similar to the one under normal, fault-free sensors operation. In all these cases, the diagnostic system should signal that the measurements are out of the range of validity of the model and that the methodology should not be applied.
For lower values of the surge line mass flow rate, it has been verified that the consequences of faults are smaller and at the same time the proposed approach work best because the measured signals fall in the region with the highest density of training patterns, where the signal validation model is more accurate.
Conclusions
An approach for the detection and identification of faulty sensors and the reconstruction of their erroneous measurements has been proposed. The effectiveness of the approach in increasing the performance of system control when a fault affects the controller input signals is confirmed by the results obtained from its application to the control of a PWR pressurizer.
The reconstruction provided by the signal validation and reconstruction model described in Section 3 provides good estimates of the true values of the measured variables and can be used for control.
The boundaries of operation of the proposed approach are defined by the region in which the training patterns fall; techniques exist to warn when the pattern under reconstruction is outside such region and is thus, no longer reliable (Fantoni et al., 1997) .
The case of simultaneous presence of multiple faults has not been considered: future work should test the approach in this situation. Also, the problem of fault propagation has not been tackled directly: the definition of a refined strategy for the distinction of false alarms will be considered in future research. Hp Hypothesis of i -th sensor being in faulty condition  Missed alarm probability 
of the true C i -th signal in case of sensor fault and in case of normal sensor conditions. 
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Appendix B Pressurizer model equations:
The pressurizer model is designed to handle the four possible situations listed in Table B .1. , where Ψ is the coefficients matrix,  is the inputs vector and z is the state variables vector.
The elements of Ψ ,  and z are here detailed for each situation considered.
Case A. Notice that the elements of the coefficients' matrix Ψ depend from the state variables so that the model is nonlinear. In practice at each time step the SIMULINK model checks in which one of the four possible cases the pressurizer is and evaluates the coefficients' matrix Ψ according to values of the state variables at the previous time step.
Appendix C Pressurizer control scheme:
The main function of a pressurizer is that of maintaining the pressure in the primary system of the plant at the reference value (150 bar) to give adequate overpressure, suppress pump cavitations and avoid bulk boiling. The pressurizer is also designed to accommodate normal volume surges. The level L of the liquid water contained in it must also be controlled in order to avoid emptying or overfilling its volume.
In order to allow this component to fulfil its functions, it is necessary to continuously control that the value of the water level L and the pressure P in the pressurizer agree with the desired reference value the measured signal and its reference value is given in input to a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller which generates the control signal for the corresponding actuator, i.e., the charging/letdown flows, the sprayers or the heaters.
The relief valve, instead, is a safety device which opens only when the pressure exceeds a limit value (here set equal to 165  max P bar) and has a constant mass flow rate.
In case of low pressure, the heaters are turned on. For a more precise control of the supplied power only one out of five heaters can deliver variable PID controlled power, whereas the other four units are back-up heaters run by control relays. All units have a maximum power of 320 kW each. The pressure is increased as a consequence of the greater mass flow rate fl m  generated by liquid water flashes produced by warming up the liquid water. If the pressure is getting too high the control signal generated by the corresponding PID is sent to the sprayers which start injecting nebulised water into the pressurizer with a maximum mass flow rate of 7 kg/s. The flow of nebulised cold water coming from the sprayers causes the condensation of the steam, thus inducing a pressure decrease. In a similar way, the deviations of the level from the reference value 
